Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sheep\u27s Clothing: Taking U.K. Rules to Continental Europe by Ventoruzzo, Marco
  
 
135 
 
TAKEOVER REGULATION AS A WOLF IN SHEEP’S 
CLOTHING:  TAKING U.K. RULES TO 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Aesop was an optimist.  In his cautionary fable that inspired the 
famous admonition about a wolf in sheep’s clothing, the predator wolf 
intentionally dons a sheep’s fleece in order to sneak up on a lamb.  The 
wolf’s disguise, it turns out, is so effective that he ends up being mistaken 
for a real sheep and being killed by another wolf.  According to Aesop, 
even the most effective fraud can turn against its perpetrator, and justice 
can be served.1  The results are not always so salutary with other 
clandestine predators, including legal rules that appear aimed at protecting 
vulnerable groups, but instead provide valuable tools to be exploited by 
predators.  The thesis of this Article is that some of the takeover regulations 
that have proven so successful at protecting minority shareholders in the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) and have been incorporated into European 
takeover regulation, may operate in Continental systems as a deceptive 
guise that ensures protection for entrenched controlling shareholders. 
In a recent and insightful work, John Armour and David Skeel address 
the reasons why takeovers in the U.K. and in the United States of America 
(U.S.) are regulated so differently.  More specifically, their work 
demonstrates how historical events and the economic, legal, and political 
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 1. In the Gospel, Matthew also warns, “Beware of false prophets, which come to you 
in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.”  Matthew 7:15 (King James). 
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climate—particularly the role of lobbying groups—in the U.S. and the U.K. 
have affected both the content of substantive takeover rules, and the 
processes through which they are created and enforced.2 
As these works describe, in the U.K., acquisition of a set threshold of 
the voting shares (thirty percent) requires the buyer to launch a mandatory 
tender offer on all the outstanding shares at the highest price paid for those 
shares.  No laws or regulations of this sort are provided under U.S. law at 
the federal level, even if some states provide for “best-price rules” whose 
effects are similar to the U.K. mandatory bid rule.3  Similarly, the British 
“City Code” imposes a ban on directors’ actions that might frustrate a 
hostile bid without shareholder approval, which contrasts starkly with the 
relative freedom that U.S. directors have to resist a hostile acquisition.4 
Armour and Skeel explain these differences by pointing to the fact 
that, notwithstanding the widespread ownership structure that both systems 
have in common, the role of institutional investors in the U.K. as 
shareholders and as an organized group influencing the policy makers, is 
absent in the U.S.  Instead, in the U.S., direct investment by small and 
disorganized shareholders is more common.  Armour and Skeel also 
examine why corporate directors and managers, in the context of American 
federalism, have a more effective role than their British counterparts in 
shaping takeover rules. 
The most original part of their contribution underlines the importance 
of the rule-making process in determining the substantive regulatory 
outcome.  In this respect, Armour and Skeel juxtapose British “coerced 
self-regulation, made under a clear governmental threat of intervention”5 
favored also by the geographical proximity of the major actors in the City, 
with the U.S. legislative and case-law processes, which are largely derived 
 2. John Armour & David Skeel, Jr, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why ?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727 
(2007); see also Marco Ventoruzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover 
Regulation:  Regulatory Means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171, 
184 (2006) (discussing the differences with further bibliographical references). 
 3. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-
MITE:  The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REV. 731, 748 (1987). 
 4. See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrel, A New Approach to Takeover Law and 
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 140 (2001).  The only constraints on U.S. 
directors are those flexible limits set by fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule.  
The adoption of a neutrality rule inspired by the British approach, even if just as an opt-in 
provision, is advocated by some American scholars as a way to increase investors’ 
protection.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrel, A New Approach to Takeover Law and 
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 140 (2001).  Contra Jonathan R. Macey, 
Displacing Delaware:  Can the Feds do a Better Job Than the States in Regulating 
Takeovers? 57 BUS. LAW. 1025 (2002)  (opposing Bebchuck’s and Ferrel’s proposition). 
 5. Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1764. 
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from litigation and judge-made rules.6  Combining these and other 
elements, they conclude that, in the U.K., coordinated and influential 
institutional investors were able to promote a private takeover regime 
particularly favorable to minority investors.  The pillars of this regime are 
the mandatory bid and the non-frustration rule.  In the U.S., by contrast, 
incumbent directors and managers were able to obtain more leeway to 
resist takeovers thanks to a number of factors ranging from U.S. federalism 
that (borrowing the image used by Armour and Skeel) amplifies the voice 
of corporate managers to the lesser impact of institutional investors’ 
lobbying efforts on the development of case-law. 
The story told by Armour and Skeel is not only well grounded and 
convincing from an historical perspective, it is also consistent with modern 
public-choice models that analyze the role of lobbying groups in 
determining the level of investors’ protection in different jurisdictions, such 
as the one recently proposed by Bebchuk and Neeman.7 
But, therein lies the rub.  If it is true that the U.K. approach to 
takeovers favors institutional investors in systems with a significant degree 
of dispersed ownership structure, why would the essential pillars of this 
approach be spontaneously adopted, well before the Thirteenth Directive, 
in several continental European countries that have concentrated ownership 
structures?  In these systems, entrenched controlling shareholders and the 
associations representing their interests are among the most influential 
pressure groups in the political arena, and institutional investors play a 
comparatively less relevant role.  In this context, Armour and Skeel’s 
analysis leads to additional questions:  Who are the lobbying groups that 
promoted this legislation?  Or, is it possible that the legislatures were 
merely particularly attentive to the need of protection of minority 
investors?  Why were countries such as France and Italy among the first, 
dating back to the 1990s, to embrace the British regime when they have 
otherwise been slower in legislative protection of minority investors? 
The answers to these questions are both consistent with and contrary 
to Armour and Skeel’s analysis.  They are apparently contrary to their more 
specific thesis that the presence or absence of effective lobbying by 
institutional investors is in large part what accounts for (or at least what 
accounted for as between the U.S. and the U.K.) whether minority-friendly 
takeover reforms were adopted.  A direct application of their analysis 
would predict that in Continental systems that lack such active institutional 
investors, the pillars of U.K. takeover regulation would not be adopted.  
Instead, the opposite is true.  These “minority-friendly” rules were adopted 
 6. Id. at 1776. 
 7. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group 
Politics (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 603, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030355. 
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in Continental systems, even before such rules were imposed by the 
European Union.  Still, the story in Continental Europe is consistent with 
Armour and Skeel’s larger narrative about the role of the relevant actors in 
effectuating substantive legal changes.  As will be demonstrated, with some 
small but meaningful adjustments, instead of protecting minorities, these 
takeover rules in systems with widespread ownership structures might 
serve the interests of the most important economic actors and pressure 
groups in those countries—strong block-holders. 
The larger moral of this tale, therefore, brings a new twist to the 
existing debate over legal transplants.  That debate considers how well a 
transplanted legal institution may be adapted to function as intended in its 
new environment, with the underlying reasoning being that a naïve 
legislature attempted to import a rule without fully considering how the 
rule would function in the different legal, social and political framework.8  
This article instead considers the more cynical possibility of whether, in the 
rush toward European harmonization, notions of good corporate 
governance can be manipulated to turn rules against their own purposes.9 
In Aesop’s fable, the effectiveness of the contrivance was limited 
because of the fortuitous intervention of another predator.  Corporate 
raiders cannot, however, dismantle the effects of anti-takeover rules in 
disguise. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  First, I offer a brief outlook on the 
ownership structures prevailing in continental Europe and, more precisely, 
in some countries used as benchmarks for the discussion.  Part III will 
 8. Beyond events in Europe, this issue is directly relevant to the U.S. debate on 
takeovers.  Several U.S. scholars have argued in favor of the adoption of rules inspired by 
the British experience, such as the non-frustration action rule.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & 
Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 111, 140 (2001) (discussing the benefits of choice-enhancing federal intervention in 
takeover law); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory 
Competition, 57 BUS. LAW. 1047 (2002) (responding to critiques of their previously cited 
article).  But see Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware:  Can the Feds Do a Better Job 
Than the States in Regulating Takeovers? 57 BUS. LAW. 1025 (2002) (criticizing the 
position of Bebchuk and Ferrell as well as their analysis and characterization of Delaware 
law); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate 
Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961 (2001) (praising the choice-enhancing aspects of Bebchuck and 
Ferrell’s position while critiquing the weaknesses of their position); Roberta Romano, The 
Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
387, 507 n. 307 (2001) (stating that there is no data indicating that the rule preferred by 
Bebchuk and Ferrell has made U.K. firms more valuable than Delaware firms); Robert 
Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1157-64 (2002) (criticizing the political assumptions 
behind Bebchuk and Ferrell’s position). 
 9. See Bebchuk & Neeman, supra note 7, at 30 (predicting that “[i]nvestor protection 
will be lower when public officials setting the level of investor protection assign a relative 
high weight to contributions from interest groups in their objective function”). 
  
2008] TAKEOVER REGULATION 139 
 
 
provide some evidence concerning the adoption of mandatory bids, board 
neutrality, and the breakthrough rule in Europe before the Thirteenth 
Directive, and its effect on takeover dynamics.  Part IV takes a closer look 
at the how some countries have implemented that directive.  The thesis 
there is that the Directive represented an occasion to tune the U.K. 
approach even more to the defensive needs of entrenched controlling 
shareholders.  Part V will discuss a case study—specifically, the adoption 
of the Thirteenth Directive in Italy.  Italy represents an excellent test for the 
thesis advanced in this work because, particularly if compared with the 
U.K., its listed corporations have a very concentrated ownership structure 
and institutional investors are relatively weak and strongly related to 
banking institutions which might be less concerned with investors’ 
protection.  Nonetheless, Italy complied with the British approach well 
before the enactment of the Thirteenth Directive.  Part VI will consider, 
with some empirical evidence, the effects on the Italian market for 
corporate control of the adoption of these rules. 
II.  SAME RULES, DIFFERENT EFFECTS:  OWNERSHIP PATTERNS IN THE 
U.K AND IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
Mandatory bid, the best price rule, board neutrality, and breakthrough 
provisions, which represent the entire panoply of what is considered to be 
effective takeover regulation, might have very different effects when 
applied in systems with concentrated ownership instead of dispersed 
ownership.  This hypothesis has been largely overlooked, especially in the 
public debate, notwithstanding the fact that it is quite intuitive.10 
Consider mandatory bids.  In very broad terms, this rule provides that 
when a bidder acquires a set threshold of voting shares of a listed 
corporation (let’s say 30 percent), it must launch an offer on all the 
outstanding shares at an equitable price.  Now imagine how this rule would 
apply in a system with a very dispersed ownership structure in which, for 
example, the average participation necessary to have de facto control of a 
corporation is ten percent.  In that context, a raider can easily succeed in a 
hostile acquisition without triggering the mandatory bid.  If the current 
 10. One important work that has promoted this thesis is by Goergen, Martynova and 
Renneboog, in which they argue that similar regulatory changes in corporate governance 
might have different, sometimes opposite effects in different countries.  More specifically, 
the implementation of the Thirteenth Directive on takeovers, whose basic features are 
largely consistent with U.K. takeovers regulation, might lead to either more dispersed or 
more concentrated ownership, depending on the initial state of the system in which it is 
introduced.  See Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate 
Governance Convergence:  Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms, (European 
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 33/2005, April 22, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=709023. 
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controlling shareholder holds ten percent of the voting shares, it might be 
sufficient to acquire, for example, eighteen percent to be in the driver’s 
seat.  And this can be done with a partial tender offer, by buying shares on 
the market, or by negotiating blocks of shares outside the market with 
qualified minority shareholders.  In any case, by not exceeding the thirty 
percent threshold, no mandatory bid is required on all the shares. 
The important implication is that, in a system with widespread 
ownership, the real goal of the mandatory bid is not so much the one of 
protecting minority investors from any change in control, but rather from a 
change in control when the resulting ownership structure of the corporation 
is characterized by the presence of a large block-holder.  The importance of 
this protection is that a new large block-holder weakens the potential 
disciplining role of the market.  In other words, mandatory bids provide a 
fair exit to shareholders when a change of control takes place that is not 
easy to reverse. 
Compare the same rule in a system in which the ownership structure is 
concentrated, and the largest shareholders typically hold a percentage 
higher than the threshold triggering the mandatory bid.  In that context, the 
practical effect of the rule is that whoever aims at obtaining control must be 
ready to buy all the outstanding shares.  Needless to say, rendering the 
acquisition more expensive might help the controlling shareholder to fend 
off an undesired suitor.11 
 11. See Rolf Skog, Does Sweden Need a Mandatory Bid Rule?  A Critical Analysis 
(Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 1997), available at 
http://www.suerf.org/download/studies/study2.pdf; see also Beate Sjåfjell, The Golden 
Mean or a Dead End? The Takeover Directive in a Shareholder versus Stakeholder 
Perspective, 22 (Sept. 23, 2005) (unpublished paper presented at Centre for European 
Company Law September 23, 2005 conference) (on file with The University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=866184.  Sjåfjell observed that, with 
respect to some Nordic countries:   
[A]n interesting possible explanatory contribution lies in the lobbyism 
of persons in control in companies (powerful managers or directors, or 
controlling shareholders) against national legislators for a mandatory bid 
rule, to make competing acquisitions of control more expensive and 
thereby less likely to happen.  This may be part of the explanation for 
the introduction of the mandatory bid rule in Sweden, after strong 
opposition from leading academics in the field.  It could also be an 
explanation for Finnish companies such as Nokia in their articles of 
association voluntarily adopting a lower threshold than the high 
legislative one. 
See also Luca Enriques, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Proposed EC Takeover Directive:  
Harmonization as Rent-Seeking? in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 
(Guido Ferrarini et al. ed., 2004) (including corporate managers and block-holders as 
“interest groups” that might gain from a mandatory bid rule, since the rule makes hostile 
bids more expensive). But see Erik Berglöf & Mike Burkart, European Takeover 
Regulation, 18 ECON. POL’Y 171, 196 (2003) (explaining that a mandatory bid rule creates an 
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In a similar vein, the board neutrality rule can also lead to dramatically 
different consequences depending on the ownership structure of the 
corporation.  This rule provides that when a tender offer is launched, the 
directors of the target corporation cannot initiate or continue any action that 
might frustrate the success of the offer without obtaining the approval of 
the shareholders’ meeting.  Once again, when the ownership structure is 
widespread, and the real agency problem is between directors and 
managers as against relatively dispersed shareholders, required approval by 
shareholders’ meeting empowers the investors.  This is especially true if—
as Armour and Skeel show to be the case in the U.K.—organized and 
competent institutional investors, able to make informed decisions, are 
present and actively participate in the shareholders’ meeting. 
Conversely, when the ownership structure is concentrated and there 
are strong controlling shareholders, the real agency problem is not between 
directors and managers, on the one hand, and dispersed equity investors, on 
the other, but rather between majority and minority shareholders.  A 
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting in that context does not really 
address the crucial issue.  More simply, when there is a controlling 
shareholder holding more than forty percent of the voting shares, a 
defensive measure against a hostile bid voted by the shareholders’ meeting 
is unlikely to resolve the inherent conflict of interest between incumbent, 
entrenched controllers able to extract private benefits from the corporation 
and minority investors that might welcome a value-maximizing bid. 
While these themes with specific references to selected European legal 
systems will be explored in more detail below, this sketch gives some form 
to the basic intuition that the same takeover rules might have different or 
even opposite effects in different markets.  Against this backdrop, it is also 
helpful to have a brief refresher on the most common ownership structures 
in five major European countries.  Figure 1 represents the average 
shareholding of the largest shareholder in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
and the U.K. 
environment where the rival will only take control of the company if small shareholders are 
also paid a premium). 
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Figure 1 - Average largest shareholder (%)
51,98
18,26
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Source: Van der Elst (2004)
France Germany Italy Spain U.K.
 
As this chart illustrates, and as is well-known, the U.K. presents a 
clearly unique ownership structure in Europe.  The difference and its 
potential effects are even more striking if we consider, as will be discussed 
later, that in most European systems, and in particular those considered in 
Figure 1, the threshold triggering the mandatory bid is set at around thirty 
percent (33.3 percent in France).  What might be less intuitively obvious, 
but is critically important, is that as a general proposition only British 
corporations can be taken over without a compulsory tender offer on all the 
shares.  In contrast, to acquire control over a continental European 
corporation, either through a friendly or a hostile mechanism, the buyer 
must be ready to buy all the shares. 
This conclusion is confirmed, and even more evident, if we consider 
the percentage of listed corporations that, in every country, is controlled 
with a participation that is greater or lesser than thirty percent, as illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 - Ownership concentration
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 As the chart clarifies, corporations controlled with less than thirty 
percent of the voting capital are the vast majority in the U.K., while the 
opposite is true in continental Europe. 
Turning now to the qualitative composition of the shareholders, we 
can assess the role played by institutional investors.  In the U.K., 
institutional investors such as mutual and pension funds are a significant 
force; in the other countries considered, however, either families or other 
private corporations make up the lion’s share. 
 
Table A - Ownership by Investor Type (source:  FESE 2007) 
 Individual 
Investors 
Public 
Sector Foreign 
Financial 
Enterprises 
Non-
financial 
Enterprises 
France 6% 11% 39% 29% 15% 
Germany 15% 7% 21% 15% 42% 
Italy 26% 10% 13% 23% 28% 
Spain 23% 3% 33% 17% 24% 
U.K. 14% 1% 33% 50% 2% 
 
 
As Table A illustrates, financial enterprises, including collective 
investment vehicles, represent across the Channel approximately fifty 
  
144 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
percent of the shareholders of listed corporations. 
A similar picture is provided by the following data in Table B, which 
enumerates the largest and second largest shareholders among the most 
relevant listed corporations: 
 
 Table B—Largest Shareholders Top 100 Corporations 
(source:  Kirchmaier, Grant 2006) 
 Largest Shareholder Second Largest Shareholder 
France family (37) institutional (24) 
Germany family (36) institutional (42) 
Italy family (30) institutional (31) 
Spain corporate (27) institutional (31) 
U.K. institutional (81) institutional (86) 
 
The same phenomenon can also be identified with respect to the 
allocation of assets managed by institutional investors.  For instance, in 
Italy and France in 2004, equity funds accounted for approximately twenty 
percent of the total number of investment funds.  The percentage was 
higher in Spain (slightly above thirty percent) and in Germany 
(approximately forty percent).  These numbers were significantly and 
consistently lower than in the U.K., where assets allocated to equity funds 
amounted to seventy percent of the total assets collectively invested.12 
Ownership structures in the United Kingdom differ both in terms of 
concentration and with regard to the role played by institutional investors.13  
Obviously, these are not the only elements that might explain the ability of 
institutional investors to influence the policy makers and obtain a certain 
degree of investor protection.  Many other variables might interfere.  If, 
however, we assume that the pillars of the British approach are particularly 
favorable to minority investors in systems with widespread ownership 
structures, as Armour and Skeel conclude, then it should be puzzling how 
that approach emerged spontaneously in jurisdictions characterized by 
concentrated ownership in which institutional investors are much less 
present.  Before turning to that specific question, it is worth briefly 
considering whether and how that approach emerged in those systems. 
 
 12. ASSOGESTIONI, GUIDA ITALIANA AL RISPARMIO GESTITO—2005 FACTBOOK, 90, 
available at www.assogestioni.it. 
 13. Mara Faccio & Larry H. P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European 
Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002) (analyzing ownership and control trends of 
corporations in Western European countries). 
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III.  THE ADOPTION OF THE U.K. APPROACH TO TAKEOVERS IN SOME 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PRIOR TO THE XIII DIRECTIVE 
As noted, several continental European systems adopted some form of 
the British approach before this was required by the European Union.  This 
part describes those national developments, putting them in an economic, 
historical, and political context. 
The U.K. led the way to the mandatory bid.  This measure was not 
immediately introduced with the Takeover Code of 1968, but in 1972 in 
response to a defensive acquisition of shares by the shareholders of a 
corporation targeted by two rival bids.  In reaction to this event, the 
Takeover Panel, the self-regulatory body administering takeover rules, 
required that any bidder purchasing forty percent or more of a corporation’s 
shares should launch a tender offer on all the outstanding shares.  In 1974 
the threshold was lowered to the current level of thirty percent.14 
France followed suit in 1989.  Law 89-531 established a mandatory 
tender offer on all the outstanding shares, as well as other securities or 
rights that might convert or attribute a voting equity stake, triggered by the 
acquisition of one-third of the voting shares.15  Until recently, French law 
did not provide a best-price rule equivalent to the one contained in the 
Takeover Code.  The French authority responsible for the promulgation and 
enforcement of takeover rules, the French Conseil des Marchés Fiancieres 
(which replaced the Conseil des Bourses des Valeurs), used to require “that 
the compulsory offer price be at least as high as the highest target share 
price during the period over which the share acquisitions giving rise to the 
compulsory offer requirement were made.”16 
Austria is also an interesting example.  The Wien Börse AG, founded 
in 1771 under Empress Maria Theresa, is one of the oldest European stock 
exchanges but one of the smallest in terms of capitalization.17  The 
corporations listed on this market generally have a concentrated ownership 
structure, and the share of collective investors is around 14.5 percent of the 
 14. Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1764. 
 15. David J. Berger, A Comparative Analysis of Takeover Regulation in the European 
Community, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 66 (1992). 
 16. Charles M. Nathan, Michael R. Fischer & Samrat Ganguly, An Overview of 
Takeover Regimes in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, 1400 PLI/CORP 943, 978 
(2003). 
 17. With a capitalization of approximately 121,800 million euro in August 2006, the 
Austrian stock exchange is slightly smaller than the Greek and Denmark ones, and 
represents approximately one-fifth of the London Stock Exchange.  See Commission Staff, 
Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids; Commission of the 
European Communities, Report on the Implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids, 
available at www.europa.eu. 
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equity capital, significantly below that of the U.K.18  Since the 1999 
Übernahmegesetz (“Takeover statute”), any entity obtaining a controlling 
interest in a corporation must launch a bid on all the outstanding shares.  
The statute provided for a rebuttable presumption that holding thirty 
percent of the voting rights, including if such ownership is attained by 
acting in concert with others, represents a controlling interest.  The 
mandatory tender offer had to be launched at a price not lower than the 
average market price of the relevant securities over a period of six months 
preceding the acquisition of the controlling interest, and in any case not 
lower than fifteen percent below the highest price paid or promised by the 
bidder in the twelve months preceding the triggering event.19 
It is relevant for our purposes to note that in the years before the 
enactment of the Takeover statute there had been two attempted, albeit 
unsuccessful, hostile takeovers of Austrian listed corporations:  one in 1997 
over Krems Chemie AG and one in 1998 over VOEST Alpine 
Eisenbahnsysteme AG.  After the adoption of the statute, since 2006, there 
have been no overtly hostile takeover attempts.20  The absence of formally 
hostile takeovers implications does not always provide an accurate picture 
of the market for corporate control because apparently friendly acquisitions 
might be conducted under the threat of a hostile offer.  Nevertheless, it is 
significant that after the adoption of the “British-style” mandatory bid, 
overtly hostile takeovers have vanished from Austria. 
Italy is another paradigmatic case.  The first takeover statute was 
enacted in 1992, and it provided that any entity that intended to acquire, or 
had acquired, a controlling interest in a listed corporation should launch a 
tender offer.  The tender offer could be partial, because the law only 
required it to be extended to the percentage of shares that would grant 
control, and the price of the offer could be freely set by the bidder.  There 
were two major problems with this approach.  First, for every listed 
corporation, it was necessary to indicate the controlling threshold, which 
could vary even overnight.  Second, the mandatory offer was not on all the 
outstanding shares, and therefore an exit was not granted to all 
shareholders. 
Also in light of these issues in 1998 a new comprehensive statute on 
financial markets regulation (so-called Testo Unico della Finanza, 
hereinafter also “T.U.F.”) profoundly reformed takeover rules.  The new 
approach followed, with respect both to mandatory bids and defensive 
measures by the target corporation, the U.K. regulatory structure.  In 
particular, pursuant to Article 106 of the T.U.F., any entity that acquired 
 18. FESE, Share Ownership Structure in Europe, February 2007. 
 19. Scott V. Simpson et al., The Future of Takeover Regulation in Europe, 1575 
PLI/CORP 725, 765 (2006). 
 20. Id. at 756. 
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thirty percent of the full voting (“ordinary”) shares of a listed corporation 
would be obliged to launch a tender offer on all the remaining full voting 
shares.  The price for the bid was to be no lower than the average of the 
average market price of the twelve months preceding the acquisition, and 
the highest price paid by the bidder in the same period of time.  The same 
piece of legislation also introduced a non-frustration rule (Article 104 of 
the T.U.F.), which provided that once a bid had been launched the directors 
of the target corporation could not initiate or continue any action that might 
frustrate the bid without shareholder approval.  This rule forbade them, for 
instance, from increasing its costs for the acquirer without the approval of 
shareholders representing at least thirty percent of the capital entitled to 
vote.  Later I will take up the dynamics of hostile takeovers in Italy 
following these legislative innovations.  But for now it is important to 
simply point out that there was a spontaneous convergence toward the 
British approach throughout Europe before the Directive 25/2004/CE. 
The different path followed by Spain does not negate this general 
trend.  Until the recent Law 6/2007 of April 12, 2007, which implemented 
the XIII Directive, the Iberian monarchy adopted an elaborate and 
complicated system that had evolved through the years.  The first 
regulation was introduced with the Real Decreto 1848/1980 of September 
5, 1980, and the last amendments were contained in the Real Decreto 
432/2003 of April 11, 2003.  Instead of describing the system in detail 
here,21 it is worth noting that the threshold triggering a mandatory offer 
was set at a percentage lower than thirty percent.  The basic framework of 
the regulation provided that the acquisition or the intention to acquire 
twenty-five percent of the voting shares of a listed corporation was 
sufficient to mandate a tender offer.  However, the mandatory offer could 
be compelled in many other cases.  In particular, if five percent 
participation was acquired and, with that ownership the buyer could 
appoint a certain number of directors, that indicated a significant influence 
on the governance of the issuer.  Spain did not, however, apply the “one-
hundred percent rule,” in the sense that the law only required a partial bid 
(on at least ten percent of the outstanding shares).  While this approach 
clearly made hostile tender offers less expensive as compared to the British 
Takeover Code, it also set the threshold of the mandatory (partial) bid at a 
particularly low level with respect to the average
Germany represented for many years an exception to the Continental 
European convergence toward the U.K. system.  Germany was in fact a 
quite strong opponent of the adoption of the XIII Directive and, in 
particular, of its non-frustration rules.22  German opposition, however, was 
 21. See LA SOCIEDAD COTIZADA 605 (Fernando Vives & Javier Pérez Ardà eds., 
Marcial Pons 2006) (providing further analysis). 
 22. See John W. Cioffi, Restructuring “Germany Inc.”:  The Politics of Company and 
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not based on resistance to the British approach generally, but instead a 
more immediate concern that an uneven playing field would develop in 
Europe that might have made German corporations more vulnerable to 
hostile acquisitions from bidders located in other countries.  Despite these 
concerns, even before the approval of the XIII Directive, Germany did 
enact a new takeover law in 2002 (the Wertpapierwerbs und- 
Ubernahmegesetz or “WpÜG”, followed by secondary regulation contained 
in the so-called WpÜG-Angebotsverordnungs), which shared the basic 
pillars of that regulation.  According to the new rules, the acquisition of a 
thirty percent participation, in the absence of a different de facto 
controlling shareholder, would trigger a mandatory tender offer on all of 
the outstanding shares.23 
These various examples illustrate a trend that can be seen throughout 
Europe.  Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of European systems from 
English, French, and German legal origins that have adopted two pillars of 
the British Takeover Code in some form or other:  the mandatory bid and 
the passivity rule.  The chart demonstrates that from 1995 to 2004, meaning 
before the necessary implementation of the XIII Directive, there has been a 
steady increase in the number of continental European countries that have 
spontaneously adopted this approach. 
Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 LAW & POL’Y 355 (2002) 
(discussing reactions to the German company law reformation from various stakeholders). 
 23. An overview of the 2001 takeover statute in English can be read in JOHANNES 
ADOLFF ET AL., PUBLIC COMPANY TAKEOVERS IN GERMANY (Verlag C.H. Beck 2002) and in 
GABRIELE APFELBACHER et al., GERMAN TAKEOVER LAW:  A COMMENTARY (Verlag C.H. 
Beck 2002).  For a discussion of possible implications of the German approach, in which the 
title itself clarifies the author’s position, see Jeffrey Gordon, An American Perspective on 
the New German Anti-Takeover Law, European Corporate Governance Inst. Working Paper 
No. 02/2002), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=336420. 
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If the adoption of these rules would have an effect on the market for 
corporate control and, in particular, would enhance the chances of a value-
maximizing change of control, either friendly or hostile, one could expect 
an increase in the takeovers and mergers and acquisition activity following 
their enactment.  Of course, numerous complex variables affect 
acquisitions, including some macroeconomic determinants that are 
independent from the local regulatory framework.  It is, however, 
reasonable to question whether these rules actually favor takeovers if their 
enactment does not seem to correspond with takeover activity.  To that end, 
Figure 4 indicates the number of takeover announcements in Europe from 
1993 to 2001. 
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Figure 4 - Takeover announcements in Europe
23
31
43
39
56
68
97
76
40
13 13
23
12
17 18
32
27
7
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
n
u
m
be
r 
of
 d
ea
ls
total tender offers total hostile bids
Source:Martynova, Renneboog (2006)
 
Just looking at the total number of takeovers, this snapshot from the 
late nineties, during a so-called “takeover wave,” does not seem to 
positively correlate with the rise of a regulatory framework similar to the 
pro-takeover British approach.  The same is true, and even more so, for 
hostile takeovers.  In Figure 3, the years 1995 and 2000 have been 
highlighted as benchmarks to mark the growing adoption of the mandatory 
bid rule and the passivity rule.  Even this simple and rough comparison 
suggests that the takeover wave of the nineties was independent from the 
converging of the regulatory framework.  Moreover, even further 
convergence toward the British regulatory model after 2000 was not 
followed by an increase, but rather by a drop, in the number of both 
friendly and hostile takeovers. 
This conclusion is even more striking if we break down the data by 
country.  Figure 5 indicates that the vast majority of hostile deals took 
place in the U.K., which once again suggests that the adoption of the pillars 
of the British approach to takeovers, in continental Europe, did not have a 
significant effect on the contestability of corporate control. 
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IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF HOW THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE HAS BEEN 
IMPLEMENTED 
It is not within the scope of this Article to analyze either the 
substantive content of the Thirteenth Directive, or the numerous and 
articulated issues concerning its implementation in the individual Member 
States.  As mentioned in the introduction, I will instead use one country, 
Italy, as a case study.  With respect to the overall European landscape, 
however, the more general point is that, in many Continental European 
countries, the adoption of the Takeovers Directive has been—to some 
extent—used as an opportunity to reduce the contestability of corporate 
control or as an occasion to introduce new rules and regulations that might 
strengthen the defensive barriers of national enterprises. 
Scholars and policymakers have already argued that the 
implementation of the Directive might, in many respects, hinder a pan-
European market for corporate control in many respects.24  It is useful at 
 
 
 24. See Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Implementation of 
the Directive on Takeover Bids, (Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, February 
21.02.2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids 
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this point to review the highlights of those arguments. 
First, with respect to the mandatory bid rule, whose adoption is neither 
optional nor subject to reciprocity, in adopting the Directive, most States 
will have increased the minimum price at which the tender offer should be 
launched, which as will be discussed later is also the case with Italy.  This 
price increase raises the overall cost of a change of control, in particular 
when connected to a hostile acquisition.  This element might affect the 
efficiency of the market for corporate control. 
Secondly, implementation of the board neutrality rule and of the 
breakthrough rule has not increased the contestability of corporate control, 
but has instead probably lowered it.  According to the European 
Commission’s Report on the implementation of the Directive, as of 
February 2007, among the fourteen Member States where the Directive had 
been implemented, board neutrality was already provided for in some 
manner in thirteen States (either at the statutory level or through self-
regulation).  Therefore, it was not an innovation brought by the Directive.  
Additionally, in five out of these thirteen States, board neutrality had been 
made subject to reciprocity according to Article 12 of Directive 
2004/25/CE, whereas the same requirement was strictly mandatory before 
the Directive.  According to the Commission itself, this development “will 
very likely hold back the emergence of an open takeover market, rather 
than promote it.”25 
Based on these observations, it is now possible to add two important 
European countries, Spain and Italy, which have adopted the Directive after 
the issuance of the above-mentioned Report.  Notably, both countries opted 
for reciprocity with respect to board neutrality and breakthrough rules.26 
In addition, all the Member States that did not provide for mandatory 
board neutrality before the Directive decided to implement it only on an 
/index_en.htm (concluding that a “large number of Member States have shown strong 
reluctance to lift takeover barriers . . . .  The number of Member States implementing the 
Directive in a seemingly protectionist way is unexpectedly large.”)  For commentary on the 
Report in Italian, see Andrea Angelillis & Chiara Mosca,  Considerazioni sul recepimento 
della tredicesima direttiva in materia di offerte pubbliche di acquisto e sulla posizione 
espressa nel documento della Commissione Europea, 52/5 RIV. SOC. 1106 (2007).  Doubts 
about the capability of the Directive to create an active market for corporate control in 
Europe have been expressed by, among others, Matteo Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and 
Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive, 6 EBOR 552 (2005).  For criticism of the 
Directive, as was expressed at an early stage of the drafting of the final version of the 
Directive, in particular because reciprocity would have hindered the market for corporate 
control, see Marco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers, ECGI Law Working Paper 14/2003, 
available at . 
 25. Report, supra note 24, at 6. 
 26. See respectively Article 104-ter of the Italian Testo Unico della Finanza, and 
Articles 60-bis, Par. 2 and 60-ter, Par. 4 of the Spanish Ley 24/1988 of July 28, 1988, as 
amended by the Ley 6/2007 of April 12, 2007. 
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optional basis pursuant to Article 12 of the Directive, with the single 
exception of Malta.  Similarly, very few Member States have imposed the 
breakthrough rule on their national corporations, providing for its 
application only on an optional basis. 
Therefore, in several Member States, there is a sort of double level of 
protection for corporations.  First, board neutrality and/or breakthrough 
rules are optional and the shareholders’ meeting of the issuer can decide 
whether or not to introduce them in the bylaws.  Second, even when this 
option is invoked, the actual application of the rules is subject to 
reciprocity.  For instance, this is true in the case of Spain with respect to the 
breakthrough rule (Article 60-ter of the Ley del Mercado de Valores 
24/1988).27 
It should also be observed that, together with the implementation of 
the Directive, some Member States have also adopted “collateral measures” 
that might help raise barriers to hostile takeovers.  For example, with the 
same statute that implemented the Thirteenth Directive, Loi n° 2006-387 of 
March 31, 2006, the French legislature introduced a new type of poison pill 
in the form of free warrants (bons de souscription), which can be issued to 
existing shareholders.  In case of a tender offer, these warrants give the 
right to subscribe new shares at a significant discount to the investors that 
have not tendered their participation.28  The shareholders’ meeting approval 
of this measure can also decide which offers will trigger the rights (for 
example, only hostile bids) and can also delegate, within a defined 
framework, the authority to issue the warrants to the board of directors. 
Without analyzing here the regulation of these new instruments, nor 
discussing their compatibility with either the Directive or other European 
law principles such as the free movement of capitals set forth by Article 56 
of the EC Treaty,29 it is worth noting that, once again, the implementation 
 27. This legislative technique raises the question of its compatibility with Article 12 of 
the Directive.  According to one interpretation, reciprocity would be allowed only when 
board neutrality and breakthrough are mandated by the state, as it is in the U. K. rather then 
when the state does not impose them, and single corporations are to voluntary opt-in these 
provisions.  Besides these hermeneutic problems, however, it is clear that the general picture 
is one of higher protections for incumbents. 
 28. See Martin Arnold & Tobias Buck, French ‘Poison Pill’ Strategy May Breach EU 
Rules, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft? 
news_id=fto022120061334518086&page=1; Martin Arnold & Tobias Buck, French Use of 
‘Poison Pill’ Strategy Pushes EU Takeover Rules to Limit, Feb. 22, 2006, FINANCIAL TIMES; 
Shearman & Sterling LLP, Implementation in France of the Takeover Directive and the New 
French Poison Pill (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.shearman.com/ma_040606/. 
 29. For an extensive interpretation of Article 56 of the European Treaty, and a 
discussion on the potential “horizontal application” of the “freedom of capitals” principle 
also among private parties, see Philippe Vigneron & Philippe Steinfeld, La Communauté 
Européenne et la Libre Circulation des Capitaux:  les Nouvelles Dispositions et Leurs 
Implications, 32/3-4 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 401, 430 (1996). 
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of the Directive has been used by some European legislatures as an 
occasion to introduce new and powerful protections for incumbents. 
V.  A PARADIGMATIC CASE-STUDY:  ITALY 
For the reasons described above, Italy provides a representative and 
helpful example of the phenomenon under examination.  This country 
presents, with respect to the ownership structure of listed corporations and 
to the financial actors most able to influence the regulatory process, 
features almost opposite to the United Kingdom.  Controlling shareholders, 
often an individual or a family, usually own significantly more than thirty 
percent of the voting shares.  Institutional investors have a growing, but 
still marginal, role when compared to their counterparts in the U.K., as 
described above.30  Moreover, they tend to be quite passive when it comes 
to corporate governance.31  Notwithstanding this contrasting factual 
background, Italy adopted the British approach to takeovers in 1998, when 
it introduced both the mandatory bid and the non-frustration rule, together 
with an embryonic form of breakthrough rule concerning shareholders’ 
agreements. 
Have these rules fostered the market for corporate control?  Did they 
really protect minority shareholders, or did they entrench existing 
incumbents?  Do the changes recently introduced by the XIII Directive 
make hostile acquisitions easier or more difficult?  Has the implementation 
of the European legislation been used to perfect barriers to unfriendly bids? 
There is no single, clear-cut answer to all of these questions.  Instead, 
using the Italian example, I will examine whether the existing empirical 
data suggests that the analysis provided by Armour and Skeel comparing 
the U.S. and the U.K. extends to the development of takeover regulation in 
continental Europe.  To this end, I will examine three takeover rules:  
mandatory bids, board neutrality, and the breakthrough rule.  I will also 
consider takeover activity and resulting ownership structures. 
 30. See discussion above. 
 31. Marcello Bianchi & Luca Enriques, Corporate Governance in Italy After the 1998 
Reform:  What Role for Institutional Investors? 43 CONSOB—QUADERNI DI FINANZA 
(2001), argued that there was room for institutional investors’ activism in Italy, basing their 
conclusion on elements such as the average voting participation hold by these investors, the 
degree of concentration in the industry that might affect coordination problems among 
investors, and their investment strategy.  The authors also point out, however, potential 
limitations to activism due to conflicts of interest of mutual funds belonging to banking 
groups and to the ownership concentration of the issuers in which they invest.  The few 
existing empirical analysis confirm a relatively low level of activism.  See also Alessandro 
Cortese & Paola Musile Tanzi, Investitori istituzionali e corporate governance.  Forme di 
attivismo e modalità di realizzazione, Giuseppe Airoldi & Giancarlo Forestieri (editors), 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. ANALISI E PROSPETTIVE DEL CASO ITALIANO, Milano:  Etas Libri 
(1998), 131 ff. 
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A. Mandatory bids. 
As discussed above, in light of the average stake of the controlling 
shareholder, in Italy as well as in other European jurisdictions, a change of 
control rarely occurs without triggering the obligation to launch a tender 
offer.  Before the implementation of Directive 2004/25/CE, Italian law 
provided that whoever acquired more than thirty percent of the full-voting 
shares should launch an offer on those shares at a set price.32  The price 
was the arithmetic average between two elements:  the average weighted 
market price of the twelve months preceding the triggering event and the 
highest price agreed upon by the bidder in the same period for the same 
shares.  The rule’s purpose is to ensure minority shareholders a fair price 
based on market conditions taking into account the highest price paid by 
the bidder, i.e. a price that includes the premium for control.  With this 
formula, only part of the premium for control was granted to minority 
shareholders.  This price rule attempted to protect minority shareholders 
while reducing the overall cost of the takeo
Implementing the Directive, the Italian legislature has introduced the 
“best-price rule” provided for by Article 5 of the Directive.  The new text 
of Article 106 T.U.F. establishes that the price offered should not be less 
than the highest price paid by the bidder in the twelve months preceding the 
(communication of) the acquisition of the triggering threshold. 
Consider some important recent takeovers that have occurred on the 
Italian market before the implementation of the Takeover Directive, 
sometimes involving foreign bidders, and what the minimum price of the 
tender offer would have been if the new rules had already been adopted.33 
A first example is the takeover that occurred in November of 2006 of 
the insurance company Toro by its competitor Generali.34  The highest 
price paid by the bidder was equal to 21.20 euro, and the average market 
price was 15.36 euro.  The minimum price at which, theoretically, the offer 
on all the outstanding shares had to be launched according to the pre-
 32. More precisely, the rule requires thirty percent of the shares granting a voting right 
concerning the appointment or removal of the directors, although no listed corporations 
issued these types of limited voting shares. 
 33. Concerning methodology, as in any case when one plays “what if . . .” with past 
events, it could be argued that, if the new rules were already in place when these 
transactions occurred, the dynamics of the market prices and the behavior of the parties 
involved would have been different.  Therefore, assuming all the variables are equal, 
applying the new minimum price rule is not correct.  This observation is undoubtedly well-
grounded.  The point of this simulation, however, is not to predict exactly what would have 
happened with a different regulatory framework, which is an impossible task, but, rather to 
provide an idea of the possible effects of the new rules looking at actual cases. 
 34. The prospectus of the tender offer, from which the information reported in the text 
is taken, is available on the website of the Italian Stock Exchange Commission at 
www.consob.it. 
  
156 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
Directive rule was, therefore, 18.28 euro.  Applying the new best-price rule 
after the Directive the offer could not be made for less than 21.20 euro per 
share.  Considering the number of the existing outstanding shares 
(63,205,726), the difference in the overall (potential) minimum cost of the 
acquisition would have amounted to approximately 185 million euro or 
about sixteen percent more than the corresponding figure applying the 
previous rules. 
A similar analysis could be conducted with respect to the takeover of 
the Italian bank Antonveneta by the Dutch bank ABN (March 2006), which 
was linked to the scandal that lead to the resignation of the former governor 
of the Italian Central Bank, Antonio Fazio.35  Using the same methods of 
calculation, the overall minimum (potential) cost of the acquisition would 
have been 246,000,000 euro higher than before the XIII Directive.36  While 
the cost of a takeover is not the only driver in the market for corporate 
control, especially when liquidity abounds on financial markets and in light 
of the capital gains that the bidder would be able to enjoy after the 
acquisition, such significant differences can undermine the economic 
feasibility of a takeover. 
The two tender offers mentioned, however, might be considered only 
partially exemplary of the problem, because in both cases the bidder, 
independently from what the law would have required, voluntarily decided 
to offer to all shareholders not only a price higher than the minimum, but 
one equal to the highest price paid.  In other words, the bidders anticipated 
the rule set forth by the Directive and, as a result, made their proposals 
more attractive. 
There are, however, many cases in which the bidder did not, or could 
not, follow a similar strategy, including two interesting examples 
concerning both “small” and “big” offers.  First, there is the acquisition of 
the Dada Corporation by RCS, one of the most important Italian publishing 
corporations which published the premier Italian newspaper, Corriere della 
Sera, which took place in December 2005.  The second example involves 
the takeover of Edison SpA by the French energy colossus EDF in October 
2005, which also attracted international attention.  In the first case the 
bidder offered the then minimum legal price of 12.75 euro per share, versus 
a minimum price that would have resulted from the Directive’s rule of 
14.30 euro.  Similarly, EDF offered 1.86 euro per share instead of 2.18.  
This would have meant a difference of approximately 11 million euro and 
417 million euro, respectively.  Notwithstanding the different scale of the 
two transactions, in the RCS/Dada case the acquisition would have cost an 
additional 12 percent and for EDF/Edison an increase of 17 percent. 
 35. See Year-End Accounts. Antonio Fazio, governor of the Bank of Italy, resigns. 
About time, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2005. 
 36. Data are again available on the prospectuses available at www.consob.it 
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Not only do the new rules make bidders pay more in terms of 
minimum price, but the number of shares that they must be ready to buy 
can also be significantly higher, thus increasing the overall consideration 
paid for the target.  Before the implementation of the Directive, Article 106 
T.U.F. simply required that the mandatory tender offer be extended to all 
the full voting shares or, more precisely, to the shares attributing the right 
to vote for the nomination and removal of directors (in brief, ordinary 
shares).  Thus, the offer should have been made to, all but only to, the 
shares that would count for the determination of the triggering threshold. 
This rule has changed with the introduction of European legislation.  
Now it is compulsory to launch an offer on all the voting shares, including 
limited voting shares that only vote in extraordinary shareholders’ meetings 
or only on specific issues.  If, for example, a corporation has issued one 
hundred ordinary, full-voting shares and eighty preferred shares with 
limited voting rights, (for example, permitting voting only on amendments 
of the bylaws), before the implementation of the Directive, any entity that 
acquired thirty-one shares of the former category had to be ready to buy the 
remaining sixty-nine.  Now the bidder must also offer to acquire, 
additionally, the eighty preferred shares.  Considering that the minimum 
price for the offer on these shares might be different, and usually lower, 
than the one paid for full-voting shares, it is clear that this difference might 
further increase the overall cost of a takeover significantly, especially when 
hostile. 
Such a conclusion is particularly true in a system, like the Italian one, 
where the use of limited voting shares is a common practice (thirty-five 
percent of listed corporations have outstanding limited voting shares), even 
if their capitalization is relatively low (accounting for approximately seven 
percent of the overall market capitalization in Italy), because these shares 
are often quoted at a discount to full-voting shares.37 
The above analysis underlines that the bidder should be ready to pay a 
very high consideration in order to acquire control of a listed corporation 
after the implementation of the Takeover Directive.  In contrast, the distinct 
ownership structures in the U.K. mean that the mandatory bid will be 
triggered for virtually any change of control, which constitutes a potentially 
powerful protective mechanism for existing incumbents that want to resist 
a hostile bid.  This is, of course, the other side of the coin of minority 
shareholder protection.  The new rules are intended to treat small investors 
better, at least on paper.  The question, however, is to what extent this 
ostensibly better treatment will actually deter, rather than foster, takeovers. 
One last point to consider is that the mandatory bid might appear 
 37. EMILIO BARUCCI, MERCATO DEI CAPITALI E CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ITALIA 97, 
(Carocci 2006). 
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favorable to minority shareholders in the case of a friendly acquisition 
where the existing controlling shareholder sells its participation, or a 
significant part thereof, to an acquirer.  In such a scenario, the same price 
per share recognized by the seller must be offered to all of the shareholders.  
However, the parties will take this element into account in their 
negotiations, thus raising as a preliminary issue whether the new rule might 
also deter friendly takeovers.38 
B.  Prohibition of directors’ controlled frustrating actions 
Together with the mandatory bid mechanism, the non-frustration 
prohibition—also called “board neutrality” or the “passivity rule”—is the 
landmark difference between U.S. and U.K. approaches to takeovers.  The 
degree of freedom enjoyed by American directors in structuring and 
deploying pre- and post-bid defenses, with the only substantive limitation 
being their fiduciary duties, is unknown in the U.K. and in those European 
countries that have adopted the U.K. approach.  The non-frustration 
prohibition of the General Principle 3 of Rule 21 of the U.K. Takeover 
Code prevents directors from either adopting or setting into motion most 
post-bid defenses.  It also requires an explicit vote by the general 
shareholders’ meeting.  Extensive debate exists whether greater leeway in 
resisting a takeover—as is the case in the U.S.—favors shareholders.39  
However, with a caveat that will be discussed later, it cannot be denied that 
board neutrality and shareholder choice in the U.K. were perceived and 
introduced as protections against directors’ and managers’ conflicts of 
interest in a takeover contest.  This purpose is confirmed in the legislative 
history of the provision. 
 38. There is a subtle but interesting issue worth mentioning.  If we carefully compare 
the old and new versions of Article 106 T.U.F. with respect to the minimum price of the 
mandatory bid, it is stated that the “highest price agreed upon” by the bidder (albeit in the 
calculation of the average) shall be taken into account first.  This formula was intended to 
uphold the spirit of the law, i.e., when the seller and the buyer agree upon a certain price, the 
latter pays after the launch of the tender offer, not before it.  The reference to prices 
(actually) paid and (simply) agreed upon was meant to avoid this possible objection.  The 
new text refers simply to the highest price “paid” by the bidder, providing, however, that 
Consob can require that a higher price be offered, with a motivated decision, if the bidder, 
or subjects acting in concert with it, have agreed upon a price higher than the one paid.  
Notwithstanding this possible “correction” by Consob, the fact that the law now only refers 
to “paid” prices might affect the ability of the bidder, in a friendly offer, to pay a different 
price to minority shareholders and to the former controlling shareholder. 
 39. Thus, the inventor of the “poison pill” should be enlisted among advocates of 
managers-controlled takeover defenses as a protection for shareholders.  Martin Lipton, 
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987);  c.f. 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW 162 (Harvard University Press 1991). 
  
2008] TAKEOVER REGULATION 159 
 
 
A recent and insightful analysis, however, questions whether this rule 
is truly important or merely illusory.40  David Kershaw persuasively argues 
that in the very jurisdiction where the non-frustration rule developed, most 
takeover defenses would also require shareholder approval in the absence 
of this rule.  General company law principles, he argues, end up requiring 
the same.  More precisely, Kershaw concludes that “in the absence of the 
non-frustration prohibition not only would post-bid, directors-controlled 
ETDs [takeover defenses] require pre-bid shareholders consent but when 
made available there is limited scope to use them for entrenchment 
purposes”.41 
To the extent that this theory is well-grounded in the U.K., even 
without a detailed analysis of corporate law in civil law systems, it is fair to 
say that in countries such as Italy, a similar conclusion would be even more 
justified.  In these systems, the extent and relevance of the competences of 
the shareholders’ meeting versus the directors are even broader than in 
common law systems.  Under Italian law, notwithstanding the fact that the 
2003 reform entrusted directors with much more significant powers 
especially with respect to the financial structure of the corporation, the 
shareholders’ meeting still retains significant powers on deciding or 
authorizing most corporate actions that might be used as defenses in a 
hostile takeover context.42  The issuing of option rights to subscribe or 
acquire the target’s shares at a discount, as well as most business 
combinations (e.g., mergers, spin-offs, contributions in kind), are used to 
increase the corporation’s capital.  These examples, among others, are all 
subject to shareholders’ approval independent of the passivity rule.  Of 
course, this does not necessarily imply that the rule is not useful.  In 
particular, its application calls for a “re-approval” of pre-bids decisions vis-
à-vis the actual tender offer.  Thus, it is possible to downgrade the potential 
impact of the passivity rule on the distribution of corporate powers in the 
Italian system. 
Independent of the scope of the non-frustration rule, the crucial point 
 40. David Kershaw, The Illusion of Importance:  Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover 
Defence Prohibition, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2007). 
 41. Id. at 306. 
 42. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law:  The Recent 
Italian Reform and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective 
Regulatory Competition, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 113, 130 (2004) (extending a similar 
observation to several civil law systems for Spain); Ignacio Lojendio Osborne, La Junta 
general de accionistas, in Guillermo J. Jiménez Sánchez (editor), DERECHO MERCANTIL, 
Ariel (2006), at 344; Maurice Cozian, Alain Viandier, Florence Deboissy, Droit des 
Sociétés, LexisNexis Litec (2006), at 223 ff.; see also Gerhard Wirth, Michael Arnold, Mark 
Greene, CORPORATE LAW IN GERMANY, Beck (2004), at 117 ff.; Marc Löbbe, Corporate 
Groups :  Competences of the Shareholders’ Meeting and Minority Protection—The 
German Federal Court of Justice’s Recent Gelatine and Macrotron Cases Redefine the 
Holzmüller Doctrine, 5 GERMAN L.J. 1057 (2004). 
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is that determining at shareholders’ meetings whether defenses in systems 
where the most important agency problem is between controlling 
shareholders holding a majority of the shares and minority investors may 
not be in the best interest of the minority shareholders. 
Needless to say, such a rule is better than nothing.  The fact that a 
defense must be approved (or re-approved) by the shareholders’ meeting 
implies several important advantages for minorities.  First and foremost, it 
has the advantage of increasing the transparency of the adoption of a 
frustrating action.  In fact, even if a defense adopted unilaterally by the 
directors would also be subject to specific disclosure obligations if it 
involved price-sensitive information,43 passage through the shareholders’ 
meeting allows organized minorities to discuss the measure and to obtain 
further information from the directors.  In addition, the existence of a 
shareholders’ meeting resolution creates at least the potential for legal 
action, such as challenging the resolution.  It may create the potential for 
obtaining a preliminary injunction from the court inhibiting the adoption of 
the defense.  The resolution might be challenged, for instance, on the 
grounds that the majority shareholder has a conflict of interest or that it is 
exercising its power in an abusive manner.  Even if sustaining claims of 
this type would be very difficult, it is at least less improbable than if the 
decision were taken only by the directors. 
In addition, in light of these issues, it is also possible for a controlling 
shareholder to approve a defensive measure in the post-bid context.  When 
a controlling shareholder holds forty percent or more of the voting shares, 
opposition by institutional investors can be virtually impossible.  In other 
words, in a market with a very concentrated ownership structure, to entrust 
the shareholders’ meeting with the approval of takeover defenses might be, 
to invoke another fable involving predatory animals, like letting the fox 
guard the henhouse.  This fable, however, comes with an additional, 
mischievous twist. 
Italian law clearly states that prior authorization at a shareholders’ 
meeting, when permissible, does not preclude directors’ liability for the 
actions that they carry out.44  When a defensive measure is actually decided 
and adopted at a shareholders’ meeting, such as in the case of issuing new 
shares, the directors simply “execute” the shareholders’ decision.  In these 
circumstances, it might be more difficult for a potential plaintiff to allege 
that directors breached their duties of care or loyalty.45  Systems that 
 43. According to Article 114 T.U.F. 
 44. T.U.F. art. 104 spells this out with specific respect to the adoption of takeover 
defenses by the directors after the shareholders’ meeting authorization, a rule set forth, in 
general terms, by C.C. art. 2364. 
 45. See, e.g., Corte app., Tobor immobiliare v. Oliani, November 5, 1991, in GIUR. IT. I, 
2, 384 (1992); and Corte app., La Gaiana v. Società italiana industria zuccheri, GIUR. 
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implement the non-frustration rule do not generally rely on directors’ 
liability to discriminate between lawful and unlawful defenses, as the U.S. 
system does.  Particularly in that context, the shareholders’ resolution 
might reduce the already slim chances that minority shareholders have of 
recovering, through a civil action, the damage they suffer as a result of a 
non-value maximizing defense.46 
With respect to the implementation of the Takeover Directive in Italy 
(but also in other continental European countries), there is one last point to 
make concerning reciprocity.  It is broadly known that the non-frustration 
principle set forth by Article 9 of the Directive, together with the 
breakthrough rule that will be discussed in the next part, encountered 
significant political opposition at the E.U. level.  Passage of the Directive 
was ultimately the result of a compromise that provided for an opt-out and 
a reciprocity clause applicable to both the non-frustration principle and the 
reciprocity clause.  Article 12 of the Directive, in fact, allows member 
states to opt-out from these two provisions.  If states do opt out, however, it 
provides that the states’ national corporations must be allowed to adopt 
either one or both rules in their bylaws.  The same Article 12 also provides 
that member states can subject the application of both the non-frustration 
rule and the breakthrough rule to reciprocity.  In other words, even if these 
rules are adopted, they are not applicable if the tender offer is launched by 
a “company which does not apply the same” rules “or by a company 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the latter.” 
As mentioned above, several continental European countries that, 
before the Directive, provided for a mandatory non-frustration rule with no 
exceptions whatsoever, took the occasion of the implementation of the 
European legislation to add a reciprocity requirement.  This was the 
approach, for instance, in France, Spain, and Italy.  Clearly enough, 
reciprocity further limits the protective strength of the non-frustration rule, 
to the extent that it has one. 
In addition, Spanish law explicitly provides that reciprocity, and 
therefore the suspension of the non-frustrating principle, only applies when 
the (hostile) offer is launched by an entity not subject to (or not controlled 
by an entity that is subject to) the same rules, and whose domicile is not in 
Spain.47  Italian and French law do not make a similar distinction.48  In 
COMM. II, 730 (1988). 
 46. For discussion of the potential civil liability of the shareholders for their voting in 
the shareholders’ meeting and a comparative analysis, see FABRIZIO GUERRERA, LA 
RESPONSABILITÀ “DELIBERATIVA” NELLE SOCIETÀ DI CAPITALI, Giappichelli (2004). 
 47. Article 60-bis paragraph 2 of the Ley de Mercado de Valores, as modified by the 
Ley 6/2007 of April 12, 2007. 
 48. See C. COM. art. L. 233-33, which states: 
Les dispositions de l'article L. 233-32 ne sont pas applicables lorsque la société 
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these countries, therefore, reciprocity might have an even broader scope of 
application, because it can also be invoked against national bidders. 
In light of these elements, it is difficult to say that the non-frustration 
rule, as adopted in Italy and amended with the implementation of the XIII 
Directive, resolved the inherent conflict of interest between controlling and 
minority shareholders, empowering the market for corporate control. 
C.  The Breakthrough Rule 
Extensive literature exists regarding the breakthrough rule set forth by 
Article 11 of Directive 2004/25/CE,49 which I will not recount here in 
detail.  In brief, the rule is designed to neutralize some typical pre-bid 
defenses, such as shareholders’ agreements limiting the free transferability 
of shares or restricting voting rights, or bylaws clauses that have similar 
effects.50  These provisions, which are either contained in the bylaws of the 
fait l'objet d'une ou plusieurs offres publiques engagées par des entités, agissant 
seules ou de concert au sens de l'article L. 233-10, dont l'une au moins 
n'applique pas ces dispositions ou des mesures équivalentes ou qui sont 
respectivement contrôlées, au sens du II ou du III de l'article L. 233-16, par des 
entités dont l'une au moins n'applique pas ces dispositions ou des mesures 
équivalentes. Toutefois, les dispositions de l'article L. 233-32 s'appliquent si les 
seules entités qui n'appliquent pas les dispositions de cet article ou des mesures 
équivalentes ou qui sont contrôlées, au sens du II ou du III de l'article L. 233-
16, par des entités qui n'appliquent pas ces dispositions ou des mesures 
équivalentes, agissent de concert, au sens de l'article L. 233-10, avec la société 
faisant l'objet de l'offre. Toute contestation portant sur l'équivalence des 
mesures fait l'objet d'une décision de l'Autorité des marchés financiers. 
Dans le cas où le premier alinéa s'applique, toute mesure prise par le conseil 
d'administration, le conseil de surveillance, le directoire, le directeur général ou 
l'un des directeurs généraux délégués de la société visée doit avoir été 
expressément autorisée pour l'hypothèse d'une offre publique par l'assemblée 
générale dans les dix-huit mois précédant le jour du dépôt de l'offre. 
L'autorisation peut notamment porter sur l'émission par le conseil 
d'administration ou le directoire des bons visés au II de l'article L. 233-32 ; dans 
ce cas, l'assemblée générale extraordinaire des actionnaires statue dans les 
conditions de quorum et de majorité prévues à l'article L. 225-98. 
Under Italian law, T.U.F. art. 104, in the relevant part, provides that board passivity and 
breakthrough rules do not apply when the tender offer is promoted by “chi non sia soggetto 
a tali disposizioni ovvero a disposizioni equivalenti, ovvero da una società o ente da questi 
controllata.  In caso di offerta promossa di concerto, è sufficiente che a tali disposizioni non 
sia soggetto anche uno solo fra gli offerenti”. 
 49. For a brief description of the rule, and additional bibliographical references, see 
Ventoruzzo, supra note 2. 
 50. In the relevant part, Article 11 of the directive 2004/25/CE provides that: 
2. Any restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in the articles of 
association of the offeree company shall not apply vis-à-vis the offeror during 
the time allowed for acceptance of the bid laid down in Article 7(1). 
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target corporation or in a separate agreement, do not apply when a 
mandatory bid is launched.  By the same token, under the breakthrough 
rule, mechanisms typically empowering controlling shareholders, such as 
multiple-voting shares, permit only one vote per share in a shareholders’ 
meeting that is called to decide on defensive measures under the board 
passivity rule.  Special powers granted by the bylaws are also neutralized if 
the bidder acquires more than three-quarters of the capital carrying voting 
rights. 
Once again, the point here is not an analytical interpretation of the 
breakthrough rule, but rather a consideration of its possible effects on the 
Any restrictions on the transfer of securities provided for in contractual 
agreements between the offeree company and holders of its securities, or in 
contractual agreements between holders of the offeree company's securities 
entered into after the adoption of this Directive, shall not apply vis-à-vis the 
offeror during the time allowed for acceptance of the bid laid down in 
Article 7(1). 
3. Restrictions on voting rights provided for in the articles of association of the 
offeree company shall not have effect at the general meeting of shareholders 
which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with Article 9. 
Restrictions on voting rights provided for in contractual agreements between the 
offeree company and holders of its securities, or in contractual agreements 
between holders of the offeree company's securities entered into after the 
adoption of this Directive, shall not have effect at the general meeting of 
shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with 
Article 9. 
Multiple-vote securities shall carry only one vote each at the general meeting of 
shareholders which decides on any defensive measures in accordance with 
Article 9. 
4. Where, following a bid, the offeror holds 75% or more of the capital carrying 
voting rights, no restrictions on the transfer of securities or on voting rights 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 nor any extraordinary rights of shareholders 
concerning the appointment or removal of board members provided for in the 
articles of association of the offeree company shall apply; multiple-vote 
securities shall carry only one vote each at the first general meeting of 
shareholders following closure of the bid, called by the offeror in order to 
amend the articles of association or to remove or appoint board members. 
To that end, the offeror shall have the right to convene a general meeting of 
shareholders at short notice, provided that the meeting does not take place 
within two weeks of notification. 
5. Where rights are removed on the basis of paragraphs 2, 3, or 4 and/or 
Article 12, equitable compensation shall be provided for any loss suffered by 
the holders of those rights.  The terms for determining such compensation and 
the arrangements for its payment shall be set by Member States. 
6. Paragraphs 3 and 4 shall not apply to securities where the restrictions on 
voting rights are compensated for by specific pecuniary advantages. 
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contestability of control.  This rule might represent a significant blow to 
some of the most important control-enhancing systems put in place by 
entrenched shareholders. 
Article 11 of the Directive is, however, not mandatory.  Member 
States can opt out, leaving corporations free to opt in if the market values 
such a measure.  This is, as mentioned above, the other well known 
compromise that was necessary to adopt the Takeover Directive. 
Not surprisingly, most European states have opted out of this rule.  
This is the case, for instance, in France, Germany, Spain, and the U.K.  
Corporations can opt in, of course, but in that case reciprocity is usually 
required, with the only exception being the British rules, which provide that 
if a corporation decides to adopt the breakthrough rule, the absence of 
reciprocity does not make the rule inapplicable. 
Italy, interestingly enough, has opted into the breakthrough rule, 
although subject to reciprocity.  But what is the real effect, in terms of 
threat to the entrenched positions of controlling shareholders, of the 
adoption of the rule?  To answer this question, it is necessary to consider 
the most common and relevant control-enhancing mechanisms, or “CEMs”, 
used by major corporations in Italy.  A report commissioned by the 
European Commission has recently been published regarding the 
proportionality principle in Europe.51  The study analyzes CEMs, which are 
legal devices used to alter the proportionality between the equity 
investment of a shareholder and his actual controlling power within the 
corporation.  Rather than a general definition, the Report describes CEMs 
as follows: 
Some of these CEMs are used to allow existing blockholders to 
enhance control by leveraging voting power (diversions related to 
the One share, One vote principle and pyramid structures).  Other 
CEMs can function as devices to lock-in control (priority shares, 
depository certificates, voting rights ceilings, ownership ceilings, 
and supermajority provisions).  Other mechanisms are 
represented by particular legal structures adopted by EU 
companies (partnerships limited by shares), are related to 
privatisation processes (golden shares and the influence of the 
State), or are coordination devices such as shareholders 
agreements, for example. 
Some of these mechanisms are diversions structurally organized by 
companies (multiple voting rights shares), while others are organized by 
 51. Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, INST. 
SHAREHOLDER SVCS., SHERMAN & STERLING, & EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST. (May, 18 
2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ 
shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf. (reporting the effects of the proportionality principle 
in member states of the European Union.) 
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shareholders (voting pacts, pre-emption pacts).52  Thirteen different types 
of CEMs have been examined in sixteen European countries, from Belgium 
to the U.K., as well as in some non-European jurisdictions.  For every 
country, statistics concerning the diffusion of CEMs among listed 
corporations are provided.  The overall picture is that deviations from the 
proportionality principle are widespread in all legal systems, as Figure 6, 
reproduced from the cited study, shows: 
 
 
Figure 6 – Diffusion of CEMs in Europe and Beyond 
 
Source:  ISS, Sherman & Sterling and ECGI (2007)
While there is not a perfect correlation, it is clear that CEMs generally 
overlap with the most typical pre-bid defenses that might be dismantled by 
 
 
 52.  INST. SHAREHOLDER SVCS., SHERMAN & STERLING, & EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE 
INST., supra note 51, at 5. 
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the breakthrough provision.  According to this Report, some of the CEMs 
adopted by a sample of twenty large Italian corporations, and particularly 
relevant for the present discussion, are indicated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3—CEMs used by a sample of 20 large Italian listed corporations 
(source:  ISS, Sherman & Sterling, ECGI 2007) 
Multiple voting right 
shares 0 
Voting rights 
ceilings 2 
Non-voting shares without 
preference 0 Ownership ceilings 6 
Non-voting preference 
shares 6 Golden shares 4 
Pyramid structures 9 Shareholders agreements 8 
 
It is also worth nothing that several of the most prevalent CEMs and 
pre-bid defenses are not neutralized by the breakthrough rule.  This is the 
case of non-voting shares with preference, because a specific provision of 
Article 11, paragraph 6, of the Directive, which is replicated in the Italian 
legislation, provides that the rule “shall not apply to securities where the 
restrictions on voting rights are compensated for by specific pecuniary 
advantages.”  Pyramid structures, which cannot be simply defined as a 
takeover defense, but surely allow a leverage effect that facilitates 
shareholders’ entrenchment, also remain unscathed by the breakthrough 
rule.53 
Shareholders’ agreements, important protection devices, are probably 
the most significant example of CEMs that would be neutralized by the 
breakthrough rule.  Once again, however, this provision, at least in the case 
of a mandatory tender offer, was already provided for by the Italian 
legislature before the enactment of the Takeover Directive.  Since 1998, 
Article 123 T.U.F. provides the right of withdrawal in order to tender 
shares from all shareholders’ agreement in case of a mandatory bid.  In 
addition, it should be kept in mind that the real and effective disincentive 
for the members of a shareholders’ agreement not to turn their backs on the 
other members and to tender their shares does not have much to do with the 
risk of being sued for breach of contract.  Instead, it has been shown to rest 
on social norms and the potential consequences of a similar treason in a 
system with significant cross-shareholdings and interlocking directors. 
 
 53. But see Stefano Mengoli, Federica Pazzaglia & Elena Sapienza, Is It Still Pizza, 
Spaghetti and Mandolino?  Effect of Governance Reforms on Corporate Ownership in Italy, 
last revised March 18, 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=966085 (indicating that 
pyramids have recently been decreasing). 
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In addition, reciprocity should also be considered.  As mentioned, if 
the bid is launched by an entity that is not subject to the breakthrough rule, 
or controlled by an entity not subject to it, the neutralization provision 
would not be applicable in any case.54  Because most European countries 
have opted out of the breakthrough provision, it is likely that, in the case of 
a takeover of an Italian corporation by a foreign corporation, the 
breakthrough rule will not apply. 
Moreover, even when the breakthrough rule applies, in light of how it 
has been regulated in Italy, it might provide an additional disincentive for 
hostile takeovers.  Article 11, paragraph 5, establishes that when a 
shareholder loses a right as a consequence of the application of the 
breakthrough rule, for instance when a preemptive right provided for by a 
shareholders’ agreement is neutralized, then “equitable compensation shall 
be provided.”  The terms for this compensation must be regulated by the 
individual Member States.  According to Article 104–bis, paragraph 5, 
T.U.F., under Italian law equitable compensation must be paid by the 
bidder if the offer is successful. 
Under this rule, the implication is that the consequences of the 
neutralization of CEMs used by the controlling shareholder should be born 
by the acquirer of the corporation.  Not only does this rule increase the 
overall cost of the tender offer, but it also grants to the existing controlling 
shareholders a cause of action through which anti-takeover litigation might 
be initiated.  In this respect, it seems to weaken the very goal of the 
breakthrough rule by making entrenched shareholders less vulnerable to the 
market for corporate control.55 
 54. The only exception are shareholders’ agreements in the case of a mandatory bid, 
from which, pursuant to Article 123 T.U.F., it is always possible to withdraw independently 
from the rules applicable to the bidder in order to tender the shares. 
55. When this article was already in page-proofs, the Italian government enacted a 
decree that, if approved by the parliament, will significantly affect takeover regulation. In 
the light of the recent financial crisis, and the current bear market, the legislature grew 
concerned that Italian corporations might become subject to attacks from hostile bidders, in 
particular foreign ones. In order to avoid this and protect national enterprises and their 
controlling shareholders, on November 29th, the government opted out of both board 
neutrality and breakthrough rule. Consequently, as it happens in Germany and the 
Netherlands, listed corporations can opt in one or both rules, but if they do not the directors 
appointed by the majority enjoy more freedom in adopting defensive measures against an 
unwelcome bidder, and bylaws can more effectively provide for stable pre-bid defenses. 
This possible regulatory innovation does not affect the soundness of the analysis conducted 
in this article. More specifically, it remains true that both the passivity rule and the 
breakthrough rule, in the Italian context – as well as in other systems with concentrated 
ownership structures – did not significantly increased the number of hostile acquisitions 
fostering a more active market for corporate control. In a way, this partial reform, confirms 
the underlying thesis that if there is a concrete fear of hostile takeovers, especially by 
foreign bidders, local policy makers change the rules in order to further protect local 
incumbents.  
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VI.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE REGARDING TAKEOVERS 
To recap briefly, Armour and Skeel’s explanation of the divergent 
developments of U.K. and U.S. takeover regulations emphasizes the 
definitive role played by institutional investors in the U.K.  The role of 
institutional investors cannot, however, explain adoption of the pillars of 
the U.K. approach—mandatory bids and the non-frustration principle—in 
continental European legal systems characterized by a concentrated 
ownership structure and relatively weak institutional investors.  This leaves 
open the question of what forces might have led to the adoption of those 
provisions.  The above analysis has shown, initially, that mandatory bids 
with strong block-holders may actually protect incumbents by making the 
acquisition of control more expensive.  Similarly, the board neutrality rule, 
in a system where the controlling shareholder holds a significant 
participation interest (often exceeding fifty percent of the voting shares), 
does not really subvert the power of the incumbents to resist hostile 
takeovers.  Instead, it may actually favor the adoption of defenses that have 
fewer risks in terms of liability for the directors. 
Given these conditions, even if institutional investors are not the 
primary actors, the public choice account that Armour and Skeel give for 
divergent approaches in the U.S. and U.K. seems coherent with the 
developments in continental Europe.  The evolution of takeover regulation 
appears to favor the subjects more likely to exercise a significant political 
influence on the rule-making process; but in this instance, it is the 
entrenched controlling shareholders who exercise it. 
While this answer seems intuitive, the question remains whether there 
is empirical or anecdotal evidence to support these intuitions.  Consider 
once again the Italian case.  The pillars of what we have defined as the 
U.K. approach, now adopted by the European Union, were introduced in 
1998.  What has happened in terms of takeover dynamics, and in particular 
hostile takeovers, since then?  Did the market for corporate control register 
significant developments? 
Before looking at numbers, consider the response of the Italian 
Ministry for Economy to the drafted legislation implementing the XIII 
Directive to the Parliament in 2007: 
I would like to underline some statistical data.  First of all, the 
acquisitions of Italian listed corporations by foreign subjects and 
vice-versa are roughly equivalent.  The empiric evidence of the 
last seven-eight years indicates that, more or less, we buy abroad 
as much as foreigners buy in Italy.  There are some important 
Italian firms have been bought by foreign subjects (Antonveneta 
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and BNL), as well as foreign enterprises (Endesa or Gitec in the 
USA) acquired by main actors of the Italian economy.  In 
addition, I want to remark an often overlooked issue.  Hostile 
takeovers, non-friendly acquisitions are extremely rare.  Down 
memory lane we can recall Olivetti-Telecom, or Generali-INA, 
but from 1999 to present days there have been very few relevant 
hostile deals.  Of course some apparently friendly offers were 
initiated as non-friendly, I do not want to deny that, but the 
important cases are a very limited number.  If, in addition, we 
consider hostile bids from foreign corporations, it is even more 
difficult to find relevant precedents . . . .  The issues of the 
passivity and break-through rules, and of the level-playing field 
with the other legal systems must be protected, but in these years 
it did not cause significant hostile cross-border takeovers on 
Italian targets, and frankly not even the other way around.56 
Actual data on hostile bids confirm this statement.  In the period 1993-
2001, for instance, there were 79 domestic and 13 cross-border hostile 
tender offer takeovers in the U.K.  These numbers alone exceed the 
combined number of all the hostile bids that occurred in seven of the most 
important European economies:  Austria (0 domestic, 3 cross-border), 
Belgium (0 either domestic or cross-border), France (13 domestic, 1 cross-
border), Germany (2 domestic and 1 cross-border), Italy (3 domestic and 1 
cross-border), Portugal (0 either domestic or cross-border), and Spain (7 
domestic, 0 cross-border).  The comparison with Italy is quite striking.  As 
Figure 7 shows, the annual average number of hostile takeovers in the U.S., 
U.K. and Italy across the 1990s illustrates this point: 
 
 56. Massimo Tononi, Vice-Sec’y of State for Econ. and Fin.,, available at:  
http://new.camera.it/_dati/lavori/stencomm/06/audiz2/2007/0725/s010.htm (speech to the 
Parliamentary Commission illustrating the drafted legislative decree implementing the 
takeover directive). 
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With respect to Italy, this evidence is consistent with the likely 
preferences of the most influential actors in a system characterized by 
concentrated ownership structure and relatively weak institutional 
investors.  If we consider the evolution of the ownership structure of Italian 
corporations, comparing 1997 (the year before the enactment of the first 
takeover regulation following the U.K. approach) with 2006, the picture 
that emerges shows that the ownership concentration is still very significant 
(Figure 8).  Additionally, there has been what might be called a “threshold 
attraction” effect, meaning an increase in the number of corporations 
controlled with a percentage between thirty and fifty percent of the voting 
shares.57  For reasons that we have previously analyzed, this effect can be 
interpreted to suggest that, in light of the mandatory bid and the structure of 
the passivity rule, holding more than thirty percent is sufficient to ensure a 
stable control, for the reasons that we have previously analyzed.  It may 
also be true that there are an increased number of corporations with a more 
widespread ownership structure where the majority shareholder holds less 
than thirty percent, but nothing comparable to the U.K. situation. 
 
 
  57. Ventoruzzo, supra note 2, at 216. 
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Figure 8 - Share ownership of controlling 
shareholder(s) in Italy
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Source: Consob (2007)
 
Also, looking at the qualitative evolution of the ownership structure 
(Figure 9), it appears that the new rules have not significantly affected the 
relative weight of large block-holders on the one hand, and institutional 
investors and dispersed shareholders, on the other hand. 
 
Figure 9 - Evolution of Ownership Structure of 
Italian Corporations
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As with other data presented above, this data confirms that rules 
similar to the British rules, when applied in a different context, do not 
ensure the same results, but may instead have an opposite (and undesirable) 
effect. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this article bears out both intuition and some 
comments by Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, who postulated that 
“similar regulatory changes may have very different effects within different 
corporate governance systems.  For example, while in some countries the 
adoption of a specific takeover rule may lead toward more dispersed 
ownership, in others this same rule may further reinforce the blockholder-
based system.”58 
In sum, the three pillars of U.K. takeover regulation and of the XIII 
Directive, the mandatory bid, the non-frustration rule, and breakthrough 
rule, could act as wolves in sheep’s clothing when they cross the Channel. 
This article raises new challenges for European legislators in terms of 
crafting legislation.  On the one hand, such legislation must provide for a 
level of harmonization that will facilitate development of a single European 
market.  On the other hand, it cannot ignore the historical and economic 
distinctions between jurisdictions that will affect how well the rules work 
to promote their intended aim. 
Legislatures and judiciaries are not perfect.  Moreover, they are not—
and, to some extent, should not be—completely immune to the lawful 
activities of lobbying groups.59  What becomes unacceptable, however, is 
when rules that protect incumbents are either erroneously or intentionally 
presented as designed to benefit minority investors. 
This conclusion does not imply a completely negative judgment on 
either the U.K. approach as adapted to continental European jurisdictions, 
or on the XIII Directive, notwithstanding the minimum harmonization that 
it provides.  As already mentioned, there are several advantages for 
minorities deriving from both the mandatory bid rule and the passivity rule, 
especially in case of a friendly acquisition that might exclude non-
controlling shareholders from benefiting from the market for corporate 
control.  In addition, the very fact that Europe has finally adopted a 
common regulatory framework has historic and legal relevance that should 
not be underestimated, even with its significant differences and potentially 
diverging effects.60  Now, more than ever, scholars, policy-makers and 
 58. Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog, supra note 10, at 29. 
 59. See Bebchuk & Neeman, supra note 7, for a model on this possible influence. 
 60. As pointed out by Gatti, supra note 24, at 560, notwithstanding the shortcomings of 
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practitioners have adopted a common language and discuss very similar 
problems concerning takeover regulation.  A better awareness on the 
crucial issues in this field is already emerging from this shared cultural 
humus. 
the limited harmonization, the approach followed by the directive might be considered a 
sound second best, according to which Member States must “clearly state their positions on 
the board neutrality rule and the BTR,” and “decide whether or not to enact the reciprocity 
clause.” 
